Poverty:The Role of Institutions, Behaviours and Culture by Harkness, S et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Harkness, S, Gregg, P & MacMillan, L 2012, Poverty: The Role of Institutions, Behaviours and Culture. Joseph
Rowntree Foundation, York, U. K.
Publication date:
2012
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Dec. 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    JRF Programme Paper 
Poverty 
 
POVERTY: THE ROLE OF 
INSTITUTIONS, BEHAVIOURS 
AND CULTURE 
 
Susan Harkness, Paul Gregg and  
Lindsey MacMillan 
June 2012 
 
This paper: 
 
 reviews evidence on the causes of poverty; 
 considers the influence of family, employment, 
geography, education, addiction and debt; and  
 evaluates the role of individual agency, 
institutional structures and culture. 
 
 
The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) 
commissioned this paper as part of its programme 
on poverty in the UK, which aims to identify the root 
causes of poverty and in justice. 
 
ISBN 978 1 85935 920 4 
© University of Bath 
 
 
 2 
 
                                      
 
 
 
Contents   
   
   
  Page 
   
 Introduction 3 
   
Section 1 Background 5 
   
Section 2 Family structure 7 
   
Section 3 Employment 13 
   
Section 4 Geographical causes of poverty 23 
   
Section 5 Poverty and educational failure 28 
   
Section 6 
 
Section 7 
 
Section 8 
Addiction  
 
Debt 
 
Conclusion 
32 
 
36 
 
40 
 
 
   
 References 42 
   
   
   
 3 
 
Introduction 
 
Poverty looks set to become an increasingly pressing issue over the coming 
years: in January 2012, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported that 
unemployment had risen to an 18-year high of 2.68 million while 1.3 million 
people were working part-time because they were unable to find a full-time job 
(the highest number since records began in 1992). For those in work, incomes 
have failed to keep up with inflation and earnings are being squeezed, with 
particular pressure for those on the lowest incomes, who face relatively high 
inflation rates (Hirsch, 2011). Meanwhile pressure to reduce public spending 
remains unabated and reform to the tax and benefit system is expected to push 
more families into poverty (Brewer et al., 2011). Yet, alongside these trends, 
recent evidence also suggests that public attitudes towards those living in 
poverty appear to be hardening: a rising share of people believe that 
unemployment benefit levels are too high and discourage work, while two out of 
three respondents to the British Social Attitudes Survey (2011) believe that some 
children live in poverty because their parents don’t want to work.   
 
This round-up undertakes a review of the evidence on the causes of poverty, 
looking in particular at how institutional structures (such as labour market 
opportunities and welfare provision), and individuals’ characteristics and 
behaviours, as well as cultural factors, are related to being in poverty. Recent 
policy under the Coalition Government has become concerned with influencing 
individual ‘agency’, which is increasingly seen as being to blame for high levels of 
poverty and social exclusion in the UK. Particularly influential in setting the policy 
agenda has been the thinking of the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) whose report 
Breakdown Britain highlighted five key areas seen as “pathways to poverty” 
(Centre for Social Justice, 2006). This report evaluates the role of individual 
agency, institutional structures and culture in influencing overall levels of poverty 
in relation to these five themes. These themes are chosen here because of their 
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prominence in current policy thinking. We also examine the geographical 
concentration of poverty, which has been widely debated in relation to poverty. 
The report therefore looks in turn at poverty and: 
 
 family structure; 
 employment and intergenerational worklessness; 
 geographical concentrations of poverty; 
 educational outcomes; 
 addiction to alcohol and drugs; and  
 debt. 
 
Throughout we refer to levels of relative poverty (the most widely watched 
UK measure of poverty) and refer only to families of working age. 
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Background 
 
By conventional European definitions UK poverty levels have risen dramatically 
since the late 1960s when the proportion of children living in relative income 
poverty was around 10 per cent. By 1996 this proportion had risen to a peak of 
just under 30 per cent. Poverty is not, however, an intractable problem and policy 
can make a difference: child poverty rates in the UK have fallen since the mid-
1990s and employment policies and income transfers played an important role in 
achieving this reduction (Chen and Corak, 2008).   
 
The drivers of poverty can be thought of as falling into three categories. First, 
structural features of the economy will influence the overall level of poverty: the 
level of wage inequality; employment opportunities (including for those from 
ethnic minority groups and disabled people who may otherwise face 
discrimination in finding work); barriers to work, such as high costs of childcare; 
and the tax and benefit systems all matter. Second, the characteristics of 
individuals also matter to their overall risk of being in poverty: for example, 
poverty is associated with characteristics such as low educational attainment or 
ill health as well as with family characteristics, particularly lone parenting. But the 
behaviours and attitudes of people in poverty (or their individual ‘agency’) may 
also matter and could provide a partial explanation as to why some individuals 
are living in poverty. Third, it has been argued that a ‘culture of dependency’ may 
exist. The literature has described cultures of worklessness existing both within 
families and being passed from one generation to the next (leading, for example, 
to intergenerational worklessness) or as persisting within geographical 
neighbourhoods. But it is also important to recognise the interrelationship 
between these drivers; government policy can, for example, influence behaviour 
by requiring claimants to engage in job search. Similarly, a lack of employment 
opportunities may alter the behaviour of those who are in poverty, as Wilson 
notes in When work disappears (Wilson, 1997). He argues that, when work 
opportunities are closed off as a consequence of an extremely weak local labour 
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market, people develop alternative lifestyle choices to cope (for example, 
choosing to have children earlier or as a lone parent), and cultural attitudes move 
away from a focus on work and education as a means of escaping deprivation. A 
particularly important current debate centres on whether poverty and 
worklessness are consequences of welfare dependence, the implication being 
that reducing the value of out-of-work benefits would reduce poverty by 
incentivising work. Similarly, welfare payments, rather than alleviating poverty 
and reducing the effects of deprivation on children’s outcomes, have been seen 
as encouraging entire generations of families to become culturally disconnected 
from society, damaging their independence, ambition and motivation, and 
trapping them in poverty (Centre for Social Justice, 2006). 
 
The policy prescriptions attached to each of these three explanations of poverty 
differ. The first suggests that poverty has structural causes and an appropriate 
policy response would be to expand employment opportunities, improve the 
financial incentives to work (for example, through tax credits or the minimum 
wage), reduce wage inequalities and tackle barriers to work. It also suggests a 
focus on supporting people into work through welfare-to-work programmes. On 
the other hand, where individual agency is considered to be a major cause of 
poverty then policy may need to intervene to alter behaviour; for example, the 
introduction of increased conditionality on the receipt of benefits for groups such 
as unemployed people or lone parents could be expected to alter their job-search 
behaviour. The third driver, while overlapping with the others, places an 
emphasis on dependency on the welfare system as a cause of poverty, and 
suggests cutting benefit entitlements, imposing time limits on welfare receipt and 
the introduction of behavioural requirements (such as requiring individuals to 
undergo training or participate in other activities such as voluntary work). In the 
following sections we explore these issues in more detail in relation to their 
influence on the five “pathways to poverty” set out above. We start by looking at 
the relationship between family structure and poverty. 
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Family structure 
 
The Centre for Social Justice think tank has argued that, of the five pathways to 
poverty that they identify, “family breakdown is often at the heart of these other 
issues” (Probert and Callan, 2011: pp. 10). Others have argued that the welfare 
system has encouraged family breakdown (see, for example, Iain Duncan Smith 
speech, 3 October 2011). This section assesses the evidence on these claims by 
addressing two questions: 
 
 What is the role of family structures in influencing overall poverty rates?  
 What evidence is there that the provision of welfare benefits has an 
influence on the ways in which families choose to live? 
 
Family structure and poverty 
 
While there is a correlation between some family structures and the incidence of 
poverty, the extent to which this association is causal has been the subject of 
significant debate. For those with children, cohabitation and lone parenthood are 
both associated with higher risks of poverty than is marriage. In the UK, 46 per 
cent of children in lone-parent families were in relative poverty in 2009/10 
compared with 24 per cent of those living with couples. Unfortunately official 
statistics do not yet give a breakdown by marital status. However, looking at very 
young children using Millennium Cohort Survey data, Kiernan et al. (2011) find 
that, when children were aged three, the likelihood of being in the bottom income 
quintile stood at 21 per cent for those whose parents were married, 38 per cent 
among cohabitees, and at 81 per cent for those living with lone parents. While 
incomes are lower for cohabiting mothers than for those who marry, the position 
of cohabitees is very different in the UK than the US, from where comparative 
evidence is often drawn. As Kiernan et al. (ibid.) note, “cohabiting mothers in the 
UK [are] only slightly more disadvantaged than their married counterparts, 
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cohabiting mothers in the US tend to be far worse off and more closely resemble 
lone mothers than married ones”.  
 
However, these associations between family types and poverty tell us little about 
causality. The extent of causality is unclear for two reasons: first, groups such as 
lone parents or teenage mothers may have a greater risk of being in poverty not 
because of their family status per se but because they are more likely to have 
other characteristics, such as low educational attainment, which raise the risk of 
poverty. Second, family structures may not only be a cause but also a 
consequence of poverty.  
 
In the UK, lone parents are on average younger and hold fewer qualifications 
than their married counterparts, while cohabiting mothers occupy an intermediate 
position (Kiernan et al., ibid.). Studies in the US have suggested that many lone 
parents would still be in poverty even if they were partnered because the 
earnings prospects of lone parents’ potential partners (who are assumed to have 
similar characteristics, such as age and education, as lone parents) are often 
weak and would not boost incomes sufficiently to avoid poverty (Page and 
Stevens, 2004). The evidence on marriage too suggests that differences in the 
characteristics of married and cohabiting parents explain most of the observed 
differences in outcomes between children. Kiernan et al., for example, using data 
from the Millennium Cohort Survey show that, in the UK, cohabiting couples have 
fewer resources but similar levels of commitment to those that are married; this, 
they argue, may suggest that cohabitation is a “poor man’s marriage” (p. 9). 
Contrasting the US and UK, they find that financial returns to marriage are larger 
in the US. Comparing children in the UK born to married and cohabiting couples, 
Goodman and Greaves (2010) find that, while children in the UK do better on 
average at ages 3 and 5 if born to married parents, these differences disappear 
after taking account of observed differences between people, for example, in age 
and prior educational attainment. Bjorklund et al. (2007) also control for such 
differences and find no causal effect of marriage on Swedish children’s 
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educational outcomes. This, they suggest, implies that those children whose 
parents married in response to financial incentives saw no gain in educational 
outcomes. In the UK, Crawford et al. (2011) similarly find marriage to have no 
causal effect on improving the cognitive or socio-emotional development of 
children. 
 
The discussion so far has assumed that it is family structures which influence 
individuals’ vulnerability to poverty. Several researchers have, however, 
suggested that the relationship may work in the opposite direction, with structural 
features of the economy instead playing an important role in influencing family 
structures. In the US, there is now a significant amount of research that suggests 
that it is poverty and inequality that causes low rates of marriage, with the 
incentives of young lone women to commit to marriage declining as a result of 
the weak economic prospects of low-skilled men (Blau et al., 2000; Gould and 
Paserman, 2003). At the same time, improved employment and earnings 
opportunities for women have further reduced the financial advantages of 
marriage (Lundberg and Pollak, 2007). Among those that are married or 
cohabiting, financial hardship and unemployment increase the likelihood of 
divorce or separation (Lampard 1994; Blekesaune 2008). And, while policy has 
couched teenage pregnancy in terms of a problem to be solved (see, for 
example, the National Teenage Pregnancy Strategy, 1999), recent evidence 
suggests that teenage parenthood may be a rational response to inadequate 
outside opportunities for young women and that it does not in itself lead to worse 
outcomes for parents and children (Cater and Coleman, 2006; Alexander et al., 
2010). 
 
Welfare benefits and family structure  
 
There are widespread “couple penalties” in the tax and benefit systems, with 
welfare benefits in particular imposing a tax on partnership (Adams and Brewer, 
2010). Yet, in spite of these financial penalties to partnership, the risk of poverty 
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remains substantially lower among those living in couples than among lone 
adults. In the UK, the number of lone-parent families has grown substantially 
over recent decades, although there was a marked reduction in the growth of 
lone parents between 1999 to 2003 after New Labour’s reforms (which raised 
both in- and out-of-work benefits for low-income families with children) compared 
with the mid-1990s (Gregg et al., 2009).   
 
So what is the evidence that welfare provision has played a substantive role in 
influencing family breakdown? US evidence has shown a correlation between 
welfare benefits and lone motherhood (Moffit, 1998) but no evidence that this 
relationship is causal (Blau et al., 2004). Studies of in-work credits, on the other 
hand, have found a small but significant positive effect of such benefits on the 
probability of marriage for those on low incomes (see Dickert-Conlin and Houser, 
2002; Eissa and Hoynes, 2003). Clearly the design of the tax and benefit system 
differs substantially between the US and UK. However, the results using UK data 
show similar trends. Anderberg (2008), for example, finds that in-work benefits, 
the WFTC (Working Families’ Tax Credit), were associated with an increase in 
partnership, although increases to out-of-work benefits, by raising the couple 
penalty, to some extent cancelled this effect out. Looking at the change in the 
total stock of lone parents, Gregg et al. (2009) find no significant effect of policy 
changes between 1999 and 2003 on the total number of lone parents. Stafford 
and Roberts’ (2009) review of international evidence on welfare and family 
structure finds that, on the basis of the reviewed literature, “there is no consistent 
and robust evidence to support claims that the welfare system has a significant 
impact upon family structure” (p. 6). 
 
Overall, the UK evidence does suggest that individuals’ partnership decisions are 
to some small extent influenced by financial incentives but the size of these 
effects are small: Anderberg (2008a) finds that even a substantial partnership 
penalty of £100/week would reduce the probability of a woman having a partner 
by about seven percentage points. He concludes that, in spite of a decade of 
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benefit reforms, the influence on the partnership rate has been much smaller 
than the influence of other external trends, leading him to conclude further that 
“the role of welfare benefits in understanding the long-run structural changes in 
society is clearly rather small” (p. 9). 
 
Government and family structure: a role for policy? 
 
The evidence presented here suggests that, while lone parents may be at a 
substantially greater risk of poverty than other family types, the extent to which 
this relationship is causal is much less conclusive. One specific argument has 
been that the provision of welfare benefits to families with children has 
encouraged the growth in lone-parent families. The evidence presented here 
suggests that welfare dependency as an explanation for the growth in family 
breakdown does not fit well with the facts. Indeed, the evidence presented here 
suggests that the growth in lone-parent families was at its most rapid prior to 
1999 when the generosity of in-work benefits to families with children increased 
substantially. Moreover, since 1999 lone-parent employment has been increasing 
rapidly (in part because in-work benefits have improved the financial incentive to 
work), thereby reducing dependence on out-of-work benefits among this group 
(Gregg et al., 2009). As Lundberg and Pollak (2007) conclude, “the potential 
effectiveness of policies to promote marriage is [...] questionable. In the United 
States, state and federal welfare reforms that imposed time limits and work 
requirements, dramatically reduced welfare rolls and promoted employment 
among low-income women. These policies, however, do not appear to have had 
significant effects on marriage or the living arrangements of children” (p. 23). 
 
An alternative explanation for family breakdown may lie elsewhere. In particular, 
evidence from the US suggests that low-quality economic opportunities for men 
have led low-income couples to delay marriage and low-skilled women to have 
children alone (Lundberg and Pollak, 2007). In the UK, lone parenthood has also 
been linked to rising male unemployment (Rowthorn and Webster, 2008). At the 
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same time, improved labour market opportunities for women have reduced the 
incentives for marriage. The declining value of marriage, according to Lundberg 
and Pollak (ibid.), may be an alternative explanation for increasingly diverse 
family forms. In the present economic environment, therefore, the very low 
economic prospects of young men, unemployment and increasing financial strain 
are likely to be important factors contributing towards a future growth in lone 
parenthood. Reducing the real value of out-of-work benefits is unlikely to lead to 
any reduction in these numbers.  
 
In the following section, we turn to look at how patterns of household 
employment and wages influence overall poverty risks, and at how these have 
been influenced by policy. 
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Employment 
 
Work and poverty  
 
Worklessness and poverty have a strong association: in 2009/10 two-thirds of 
working-age adults living in workless households were in poverty compared with 
15 per cent of families where someone worked (HBAI, 2011). While traditionally 
employment policies have focused on unemployed people (those who are both 
looking for and available for work), today it is inactivity that is the main cause of 
worklessness. The economically inactive make up around ¾ of workless 
households in the UK (ONS, 2011), and “unemployment, per se, is irrelevant” 
(Nickell, 2003, p. 19). This is because rising non-employment has, since the 
1970s, been heavily focused on those who are inactive and not on unemployed 
people. For example, among men aged 25–64, male unemployment was roughly 
the same in the 1970s and early 2000s, at around 5 per cent. On the other hand, 
male inactivity rates rose from around 4 per cent to 13 per cent, and for those 
with few qualifications unemployment rates fell while at the same time inactivity 
rates tripled (Nickell, ibid.). The rising number of workless households was 
driven, between 1979 and 1999, by two factors: rising inactivity among less-
skilled men and the growing number of single-parent households. Since 1999, a 
series of policies have been put in place to encourage the inactive to move back 
into the labour market. While those in receipt of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) 
have always been required to search for and be available to work, the extension 
of job-seeking expectations to those on other benefits was a major area of policy 
reform under New Labour, particularly from 2003 on. These ‘active labour market 
policies’ (ALMPs) focused on the economically inactive and placed new 
expectations on them to engage in job-search or work-related activities. Since 
1999, single parents and those on incapacity benefits have been a particular 
focus for reform.  
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The activation strategies employed throughout much of the 2000s had relatively 
few conditions attached: for lone parents, for example, participation in New Deal 
programmes was voluntary and, while ‘work-focused interviews’ (rolled out from 
2003) did require lone parents to attend for interview, work requirements were 
limited. More recent changes have increased conditionality, with lone parents 
with a youngest child aged over 12 being moved from Income Support (IS) to 
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) from 2008 onward. Since 2008, more lone parents 
have been moved to IS as the child’s age threshold has been reduced: in 2011, 
all those with a youngest child aged 5 were moved on to JSA. While activation 
strategies have attempted to move those who were previously inactive into 
employment, at the same time a raft of initiatives was put in place from 1999 
onwards to ‘make work pay’, with the extension of financial support to those in 
work through the tax credit system. 
 
The evidence suggests that these policies had some success: for lone parents, 
employment rates rose from 42 per cent in 1992 to 56 per cent in 2005 (Gregg et 
al., 2009) and most evaluations have concluded that policy had a significant 
influence in raising the overall employment rate. For disabled people, however, 
the effect of policy appears to have been much smaller. Between 1979 and 1999 
the number of Incapacity Benefit (IB) claimants grew from ¾ million to over 2.5 
million. While the figure has stabilised since 1999 it has not shown any reduction 
(in spite of high employment rates). While the 2000s saw some small 
improvement in the employment rates of disabled people, when overall 
employment rates were high, the ‘disability employment penalty’ (the gap in 
employment probabilities between those with a disability and otherwise similar 
non-disabled people) has remained at around 28 per cent since 2000 (Berthoud, 
2011). Several authors have noted that disabled people’s employment prospects 
are much more responsive than others to local labour market conditions and 
employment opportunities (see, for example, Beatty and Fothergill, 2007; 
Berthoud, 2011). There is also a strong association between illness and disability 
and skill levels, with IB claimants more likely to have few qualifications (Nickell, 
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2003). Recent reforms have rolled out changes in the system of support for those 
previously claiming incapacity benefits. All claimants are to be required to 
undertake a Work Capability Assessment (WCA) and those who are considered 
too ill or disabled to work are to be migrated over to the Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) while others will be placed on JSA. While ESA was introduced 
for new claimants in 2008, the existing stock of IB claimants are due to undergo 
the WCA and migrate to ESA or JSA between 2010 and 2014. The full impact of 
these changes is yet to be evaluated.   
 
While worklessness remains a considerable risk for poverty, recent policy 
changes for those who are out of work have been very much geared towards 
both activating claimants and rewarding work. In this sense, changes in the 
structures of the benefit system since 1999 have aimed to alter both expectations 
and behaviours around work. As Daguerre and Etherington (2009) have noted, 
the UK “is clearly in the top league of countries to place increased pressure on 
benefit claimants” (p. 1). It is also worth noting that while the value of out-of-work 
benefits, particularly for those with children, did increase under New Labour, the 
level of benefits for those out of work, and in particular for those without children, 
remains historically low. 
 
Yet, while living in a household with someone in work substantially reduces the 
likelihood of being in poverty, work is not a panacea. Around half of those who 
are in poverty and of working age live in a household where at least one person 
works. At most risk are those families with a single earner in low-wage or part-
time jobs, with families headed by one female earner (whether single or 
partnered) particularly likely to be in poverty (Harkness, 2010). On the other 
hand, in families with two earners fewer than 5 per cent are in poverty (HBAI, 
2011). Female employment has been increasingly polarised: participation rates 
among the most educated women are rising while the employment rate among 
those with fewer qualifications is substantially lower, and women are much more 
likely to work part-time. The tax and benefit system has had a particularly strong 
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influence in limiting the work incentives for less-educated women with employed 
but lower-earning partners (see Evans and Harkness, 2010). Several authors 
have also noted that women whose male partners are unemployed have a low 
propensity to work (Layard et al., 1980; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996, 2001; 
Bingley and Walker, 2001), although recent evidence has shown that this link 
between partners’ employment may be weakening. This may partly be because 
women’s economic position in the labour market has improved, with higher 
employment rates and relative earnings, and partly because the system of tax 
credits has improved the incentives for a single earner to work even when 
employment is part-time (of at least 16 hours) or low paid (Harkness and Evans, 
2011). Evidence from the 2008/09 recession in the UK and US has shown that 
families are increasingly relying on women as breadwinners (Boushey, 2009; 
Harkness and Evans, ibid.; Smith, 2009) but that these families are at a 
heightened risk of poverty.  
 
While working poverty is a substantial problem, it has been established that low 
pay is not the main cause of poverty for this group. Indeed, low-paid workers are 
not typically in poverty; just 14 per cent of low-paid workers live in households 
below the poverty line (see Gardiner and Millar, 2006). The low overlap between 
low pay and poverty has implications for anti-poverty policies; in particular, it 
suggests that policies which influence wage rates, such as minimum wages, will 
have only a small impact on poverty. Instead, underemployment is a major issue 
among households in working poverty, with most of them employed too few 
hours to escape poverty (OECD, 2009). Reducing in-work poverty is therefore 
likely to require interventions to improve vulnerable groups’ labour market 
integration and, in particular, to ensure that those moving into work progress in 
their jobs (Crettaz and Bonoli, 2010). 
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Young people and employment 
 
This recession has left a legacy of high youth unemployment, a common facet of 
most recessions affecting most countries. In hard times, young people face two 
hurdles to finding work. First, firms tend to hold onto their existing experienced 
staff and focus on reducing recruitment in order to lower staff numbers. This 
collapse in new vacancies hits young people hardest. Second, with more 
unemployment comes more choice of potential employees for firms who are 
hiring. Firms favour previous experience and this places young people in a catch-
22 situation of not being able to get the experience they need to get work 
because they can’t get the work in the first place. For young people, the labour 
market has also become increasingly competitive because of rising skill levels 
across the population: in 2000, the number of 25- to 50-year-olds with NVQ Level 
4 qualifications or better stood at 28 per cent, but by 2010 this proportion had 
grown to 38 per cent (Aldridge et al., 2011). For the least educated or those who 
are unlucky enough to experience long periods out of work, it becomes 
increasingly hard to get that break which opens the door to the labour market. 
This locks many young people out of work for long periods and raises concerns 
over ‘scarring’ effects, where a period of unemployment or deprivation damages 
future employment and wage prospects (Gregg, 2001).   
 
In the UK, we can see from previous generations’ experiences of youth 
unemployment that the longer individuals spent out of work as a youth the more 
time they also spent out of work later in life and, when in work, the lower their 
wages. It is possible that these legacies may not reflect just the pure effect of 
youth unemployment but also the fact that those experiencing more 
unemployment are less well-educated and come from deprived backgrounds. 
Evidence suggests that about half of the later lower wages and higher 
unemployment exposure stems from background differences between people 
and about half is a result of the unemployment itself (Gregg and Tominey, 2005). 
After accounting for these differences, a year of youth unemployment is found to 
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reduce earnings ten years later by about 6 per cent and means that individuals 
spend an extra month unemployed every year up to their mid-30s. These effects 
diminish slowly in later adult life but are still present well into people’s 40s (see 
Gregg, 2001; Gregg and Tominey, 2005; Bell and Blanchflower, 2011). The 
evidence on scarring, then, shows that young people who are unemployed during 
a recession suffer long-lasting damaging consequences. While it is almost never 
the case that people affected by the recession never work, unemployment is 
more frequent and pay lower when they return to work after long-term 
unemployment. The collapse of work opportunities during a recession gives 
young people who enter the labour market at this point an adverse labour market 
record, and this counts against them even after labour market opportunities have 
improved.  
 
Intergenerational worklessness 
 
An increasing concern within the public domain and for policy-makers is that the 
effects of worklessness stretch further than just the individuals’ own experiences. 
If workless spells are correlated across generations, then the poverty associated 
with weak attachment to the labour market will be highly persistent. Despite this 
interest, there has been very little evidence on this topic in the UK to date. 
MacMillan (2011) shows that, while only a small number of multi-generation 
households are completely workless, there is a strong intergenerational 
correlation in worklessness across generations in the UK. While it is difficult to 
distinguish whether these intergenerational correlations are driven by welfare 
dependency or are a consequence of deprivation (mainly as a result of a lack of 
work opportunities), comparative evidence on the intergenerational transmission 
of worklessness from the UK and the US suggests that the welfare dependency 
argument does not hold (Gregg and MacMillan, 2012). 
 
MacMillan (2011) finds that one in five households in the UK have two or more 
generations of working age co-residing. Of these, 4 per cent (178,000 
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households) were in a position where every generation was workless at the time 
of interview. There are also many households where both generations have 
experienced sustained periods of worklessness: 141,000 households had two or 
more generations who had not worked for over a year at the time of interview. If 
this duration is increased further, to both generations spending five or more years 
out of work concurrently up to the point of interview, there are still 80,000 
households in this position. However, contrary to some commentary on this 
subject, there are very few households where both generations have never 
worked. Only 15,000 households in the UK have two or more generations who 
report having ‘never worked’ and, of these, 35 per cent of the second generation 
have been out of education for less than a year. The current situation therefore is 
that 0.8 per cent of all households in the UK have two or more generations with 
significant time out of work, although for these families intergenerational 
worklessness is a real problem.  
 
Looking beyond families that live in the same household, sons whose father was 
workless when the son was aged 11 and 16 in the National Child Development 
Study (or 10 and 16 in the Birth Cohort Study) spend on average 8–11 per cent 
more time out of work and education between the age of 16 and 23 than those 
whose father was employed at the same points in time. Sons with workless 
fathers are also 15–18 per cent more likely to spend a year or more in concurrent 
spells out of work and education over the same period. These effects are large, 
and evidence suggests a wage penalty at age 33 of between 10 and 22 per cent 
for those spending a year out of work compared with those experiencing no 
youth unemployment (Gregg and Tominey, 2005).  
 
However, local labour market conditions can make a difference. In labour 
markets where the unemployment rate is high, sons with workless fathers in 
childhood spend on average 25–30 per cent more time out of work than sons 
with employed fathers in childhood in the same local labour market (MacMillan, 
2011). By contrast, in tight labour markets where unemployment is low, there is 
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no difference in the labour market experience of sons whether their fathers were 
workless or employed during the sons’ childhood. The fact that there is no 
intergenerational relationship in areas of low unemployment, and a strong 
relationship in high unemployment areas, suggests two potential mechanisms 
that drive the relationship: deprivation or dependency. The standard welfare 
dependency argument suggests that in areas with weak labour markets, a culture 
of acceptance of welfare means that claiming becomes less stigmatised than it 
might be in tighter labour markets. It is argued that the removal of welfare would 
incentivise people to move to find work who might otherwise not. The alternative 
may be that multiple deprivation in these areas with few jobs would lead marginal 
workers (those with the weakest attachment to the labour market) to suffer most 
in weak labour markets and become even worse off. MacMillan (2011) finds that, 
in addition to sons with workless fathers having lower cognitive skills and 
educational attainment, they also score worse on personality tests such as 
antisocial behaviour and extroversion. Evidence from Heckman et al. (2006) 
indicates that non-cognitive and cognitive skills are important for future 
employability. 
 
It is very difficult to distinguish between the two competing explanations in this 
context. However, one way of distinguishing between the two competing 
hypotheses is to compare intergenerational workless correlations across time, 
where the welfare system has changed, or across countries that have different 
welfare systems in place. Recent evidence from Gregg and MacMillan (2012) 
compares the intergenerational correlation in workless spells of fathers and sons 
in the US and the UK. Access to unemployment insurance is quite different in the 
two countries, particularly for young men. Whereas in the UK, those seeking 
work are entitled to both contributory and income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance 
(JSA), in the US unemployment insurance is typically only available on a 
contributory basis after the young male has worked in covered employment for at 
least five quarters. There are also time limits in place that vary state by state. It is 
therefore harder to access welfare if you are a young man in the US compared 
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with the UK. We might expect therefore that intergenerational workless 
correlations in the US would be weaker if the driver of this relationship was 
welfare dependency. The intergenerational correlations in the two countries are 
in fact very similar (0.11 in the US compared with 0.13 in the UK), suggesting 
that welfare dependency may not be driving this relationship.  
 
Poor neighbourhoods have been linked to intergenerational patterns of 
worklessness. For example, Iain Duncan Smith has argued that “pockets in 
which social housing, once a support for families working hard to give their 
children something better, has too often become a place of intergenerational 
worklessness, hopelessness and dependency” (Iain Duncan Smith speech, 3 
October 2011). However, the empirical evidence on long-term poverty and social 
exclusion finds that the numbers that are permanently excluded are very small 
(Burchardt et al., 2002). 
 
Employment: policy implications 
 
The discussion of work and poverty has emphasised the importance of 
employment opportunities for reducing poverty. In particular, it suggests that 
policies which enable women, and in particular mothers, to work can have a 
substantial influence on overall poverty rates (see also Bradshaw, 2006). Reports 
have suggested that the benefits system has disincentivised work and 
encouraged a culture of dependency (see, for example, Centre for Social Justice, 
2007). However, the OECD (2011a) has shown that falling relative values of 
benefits have increasingly contributed to rising poverty rates across countries. 
Moreover, since 1999 the UK has pursued an aggressive policy of activating 
those who were previously outside the labour market, inactive groups including 
lone parents and disabled people. These changes, particularly for lone parents, 
alongside high levels of overall employment, have led to a rapid increase in 
employment rates across most disadvantaged groups. Recent reforms will put 
greater pressure on many to work: for example, reforms introduced in 2011 
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redefine all lone parents with children over 5 as jobseekers and leave few with 
the option of remaining outside the labour market. Similar reforms are also 
affecting those in poor health (see below). However, entering work may not be 
enough to avoid poverty: if policy is to address in-work poverty then issues of 
underemployment, lack of progression in work, and developing skills of the 
lowest paid will be important areas for policy in the future. Qualitative research 
among lone parents has highlighted how, in spite of lone mothers having a strong 
commitment to sustaining employment, they face difficulties in ensuring adequate 
income or progression to better pay. It also suggests that children of lone 
mothers are very supportive of their mothers being in work, both emotionally and 
practically, and does not support the hypothesis that attitudes towards work and 
benefit dependency attitudes are being passed down through generations (Millar 
and Ridge, 2009; Ridge and Millar, 2011). 
  
This section has highlighted the long-lasting and damaging consequences of 
youth unemployment. Young people who are entering the labour market during 
the recession will need extra help in developing their skills if they are to avoid 
long-term ‘scarring’ effects. We have also explored the issue of intergenerational 
worklessness and found little evidence for the existence of families never working 
across generations (even among a single generation virtually no one has zero 
experience of doing paid work by middle age). However, there is a correlation in 
the experience of periods of unemployment of fathers and sons, with local labour 
market conditions an important factor driving this relationship. The following 
section explores further the influence of geography and neighbourhoods on 
poverty. 
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Geographical causes of poverty 
 
Both in the UK and internationally, the geographical concentration of poverty 
increased over the 1980s and 1990s (see Glennester et al., 1999; Lupton and 
Power, 2004). More recent evidence does suggest that, while disparities between 
the most deprived and other areas have narrowed, the gap remains large (Hills et 
al., 2010). Analysis of the geography of poverty has been addressed in two ways: 
researchers have either looked at the influence of neighbourhoods on poverty or 
the impact of social housing (although clearly there is a strong overlap). Here we 
review the evidence on what has happened to poverty and worklessness across 
each of these dimensions and look at the evidence as to whether poverty within 
these neighbourhoods has led to a ‘culture’ of poverty.  
 
Poverty and place 
 
In the UK, areas in poverty are characterised in two ways: areas that were ‘built 
poor’ (for example, to house low-paid workers or for slum clearance) and have 
stayed so; or those that have become deprived over time (for example, areas of 
cheap rent which were occupied by immigrants as cities expanded and the rich 
moved to the suburbs: see Lupton, 2003). Economic decline has been an 
important factor in the concentration of poverty; the loss of industry and jobs, 
combined with low-quality housing stock, has failed to draw new workers to these 
areas. In England, cities and regions in the North of England and the Midlands 
have experienced some of the worst consequences of decline (Lupton, 2005). 
There is also evidence that, across areas, the division between ‘work-rich’ and 
‘work-poor’ households is increasing (Wheeler et al., 2005). 
 
While worklessness and poverty rates differ by region, there is a long-running 
debate as to whether living in a particular neighbourhood has any influence on an 
individual’s job prospects. Cheshire et al. (2003) argue that, “[The poor] are not 
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poor because of where they live; rather they live where they do because they are 
poor. And, indeed, the evidence shows that if they get less poor by improving 
their position within the labour market, they tend to move away from the most 
deprived areas to be replaced by households as deprived as they were recently 
themselves” (p. 85). Similarly, Gibbons et al. (2005) find that the low rates of 
employment of those in the most deprived wards would not change by much if 
they lived in better wards in the same city. 
 
An issue strongly correlated with geographical concentrations of poverty is that of 
high rates of poverty and worklessness among those living in social housing. 
John Hills (2007), in his report to the Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG), describes how the profile of those living in social housing 
has changed as the size of the sector has declined and provision has become 
increasingly focused on those with the greatest needs. As a result, those living in 
social housing have very high rates of poverty and worklesness: in 2006, two out 
of three heads of households in the social rented sector had no job. A key driver 
of this is the allocation policy for social housing. Those who are selected into 
social housing are among the neediest: relatively large proportions have a 
disability, are lone parents, are from ethnic minority groups, or are of pensionable 
age (Lupton et al., 2009; Hills, 2007). While these characteristics may help 
explain some of the differences in employment rates, other effects also appear to 
be at play. One issue, Hills suggests, is mobility: once individuals become 
tenants in the social rented sector they are very unlikely to move, and very small 
numbers of individuals living in social housing make employment-related job 
moves. This lack of spatial mobility in turn restricts employment opportunities for 
social housing tenants. A second issue is welfare dependency, with those on 
housing benefit and living in rented accommodation facing higher participation 
and marginal tax rates, and therefore a greater ‘poverty trap’, than those with 
other tenures. This, in turn, leads to particularly weak work incentives for this 
group of benefit claimants.   
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‘Cultures’ of poverty 
 
The concentration of poverty among certain groups and areas has given rise 
historically to discussions of ‘cultures’ of poverty where “a subculture with its own 
structure and rationale, as a way of life which is passed down from generation to 
generation along family lines” (Lewis, 1967, quoted in Lister, 2004, p. 106) with 
those that were in poverty having feelings of being marginal to society. Wilson 
(1987) argues that the social norms and values which operate in deprived 
locations inform individual behaviour, with high levels of unemployment and 
crime encouraging the social isolation of communities and restricting social 
mobility.  
 
Employment patterns are of particular importance; Wilson (1997) has argued that 
the impact of the absence of work is more than simply the poverty associated 
with not working – neighbourhoods with poverty and employed people are not the 
same as neighbourhoods with poverty and worklessness. As work disappears 
from an area, the individuals in these neighbourhoods face less access to 
employment; this creates an alternative culture, lacking routine, organisation and 
structure, all of which are skills valued by employers. These individuals also have 
weaker social networks to provide opportunities and access to sustainable 
employment. These “learned behavioural responses” to poverty in areas where 
there are no jobs may be changed but, it is argued, this takes time even in 
economic boom years (Glennester et al., 1999). As Layard (1997) notes, even 
during the mid-1990s when unemployment rates were low, large numbers were 
effectively not part of the labour market.  
 
As discussed earlier, slack labour markets too have an important role to play in 
influencing the opportunities of the most deprived. Recent work on Incapacity 
Benefit argues that area-based employment opportunities are important both for 
individuals’ perceptions of ill health and to the employment consequences of it. 
Looking across areas, Beatty and Fothergill (2011) find that where labour 
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demand is high, such as in the South of England prior to 2008, people with health 
problems and disabilities were much more likely to work. But in more competitive 
labour markets with weak labour demand, such as old industrial Northern towns 
and the Welsh valleys, ill health had a much stronger influence in determining 
who did or does not work.  Claims for incapacity benefits have as a result 
become increasingly concentrated by area, with reforms to incapacity benefits 
expected to lead to significant loss of income while having little effect on 
employment (Beatty and Fothergill, ibid.). In a similar vein, Wheeler et al. (2005) 
note that location can be as important as qualifications in influencing the kind of 
jobs people do.  
 
While employment opportunities have an important role to play in determining 
how individuals within poor neighbourhoods fare, there is little evidence of a 
‘culture’ of poverty in the UK (see previous section).  As Low (2011) notes, the 
evidence shows that “most excluded neighbourhoods may be characterised by 
acute tensions and problems, but they are not ‘broken’ or ‘dislocated’. Most 
residents living there share values and aspirations similar to the rest of us: 
fairness, hard work and responsibility” (p. 1). Recent work supported by JRF, 
which examined six low-income neighbourhoods in England, Scotland and 
Wales, found not only that values there were similar to those elsewhere, but also 
that “many people cared deeply about their neighbourhoods, and liked living 
there” (Low, 2011: p. 2) in spite of problems of antisocial behaviour and gangs. 
The idea that these communities are dislocated from the rest of society was not, 
in this study, born out by the evidence (see Cole et al., 2011).  
 
Geography: policy implications  
 
The review has highlighted worklessness and low levels of economic growth as 
particular problems for deprived communities. Many of the areas in which poverty 
has become concentrated today have suffered because of economic decline. 
While in boom times economic growth and high employment rates may provide 
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some relief, the beneficial effects are often slow to be felt. Economic growth does 
not always translate into an even improvement in the quality of local labour 
markets. If economic growth does not reach these areas then there must be 
interventions to reduce the concentration of poverty. Efforts to address 
regeneration of neighbourhoods will need to pay attention to the links between 
areas from business perspectives and the travel-to-work area and population 
concentrations that provide labour supply to firms. Policies which improve the 
attractiveness of these areas to the better-off, such as investment to improve the 
quality of housing stock and local facilities, could help to reduce further 
segregation of those in deprived communities from the mainstream (Power, 
1997). A lack of local leadership and political representation are also barriers to 
these communities and JRF has argued for greater investment in support and 
advice services for community organisations (Low, 2011). Young people are at 
particular risk in the current economic downturn and policies targeted on young 
people in the most deprived areas will be essential to promote social cohesion in 
future years. 
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Poverty and educational failure 
 
A large body of existing research shows that children from poorer backgrounds 
do less well in a number of dimensions than their peers. But, in the context being 
discussed here, it is important to assess whether this is due to a lack of income 
itself, a lack of parental education or similar, or a set of attitudes and behaviours 
that lead to poorer parenting associated with poverty and welfare dependence. 
 
In the US, a significant amount of research has been carried out on welfare 
reforms and the effect they have on children. Duncan and Chase-Lansdale 
(2001) use results from a large number of experimental interventions and 
conclude the main findings for pre-school children were: “welfare reform 
packages can have positive impacts on children’s achievement and behaviour”; 
and “there is little evidence to suggest that elementary school-aged children are 
harmed by the welfare reform packages built into the experiment” (p. 18). The 
difference between the programmes that gave earnings supplements (and 
therefore increased incomes) and the programmes that had mandatory work 
requirements (boosting employment without increasing income) are noticeable. 
This suggests a strong link between increased income and child outcomes, 
suggesting in turn that policy should focus on financial incentives rather than 
work requirements alone. These experimental interventions offer powerful 
evidence that income has sizeable effects on attainment for those aged under 6 
and (statistically significant) income effects of similar magnitude but less clear for 
teenagers, whereas work without income gains has no, or slightly negative, 
effects on children’s educational attainment. However, this evidence is limited to 
small income gains for low-income lone-parent families and it is not clear how 
this would translate to wider populations.   
 
While money is rarely given randomly via experiments, income shocks do occur 
naturally through economic recessions or tax and welfare changes. Dahl and 
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Lochner (2005) explore the impact of income changes resulting from the US 
Earned Income Tax Credit. They suggest that an extra $1,000 (£700) a year in 
tax credits over three years raises reading and maths scores by about 3 per cent 
of a standard deviation. This appears similar to the experimental evidence 
described above but averaged over all school-age children. They also suggest 
that the effect is larger for poorer families. In the UK, evidence also suggests that 
raising the incomes of the families in poverty could substantially reduce the gap 
in educational attainment between those on free school meals and other children 
(Gregg, 2008). 
 
In addition to income, the level of education of the mother has significant effects 
on child outcomes. Magnuson and McGroder (2002) explore US welfare 
experiments that focus on raising mothers’ education levels rather than on work. 
While these programmes were not successful in raising mothers’ employment or 
income, the estimated effect of mothers’ education on children’s outcomes 
showed higher levels of maternal education to be significantly correlated with 
children’s academic school readiness and negatively associated with children’s 
academic problems. In a similar vein, Dickson et al. (2011) looked at the effect 
on children born to parents affected by the raising of the school leaving age in 
1973 in the UK. This meant about one-third of children stayed on for an extra 
year in school and about 7 per cent gained some qualifications that they 
otherwise would not have achieved. The effects for their children were 
substantial: the educational boost for these parents raised their children’s 
attainment scores, with GCSE grades among those of the next generation being 
raised by five grades in total. 
 
Aspirations, attitudes and behaviours of parents and children matter to their 
achievements too, and play a potentially important role in explaining why those 
from low-income families perform less well. Gregg and Goodman’s report (2010) 
finds key differences between children from poorer and better-off homes for pre-
school children, those at primary school and children of secondary school age. 
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For those under 5, Gregg and Goodman identify differences in health and well-
being (e.g., birth weight, breastfeeding and maternal depression); family 
interaction (e.g., mother–child closeness); parenting styles and rules (e.g., having 
regular bedtimes and mealtimes); and the home learning environment (e.g., 
reading to children and presence of books). As children go to primary school, the 
gap between children from poor backgrounds and others grows further. 
Differences in parental attitudes and educational aspirations for their children, 
and the greater behavioural problems in children of primary school age from low-
income backgrounds, are found to explain around one-third of the difference in 
progress made between rich and poor children between the ages of 7 and 11.  
 
While the gap in attainment between rich and poor children grows less rapidly 
once children reach secondary school, by the age of 16 (when children take their 
GCSEs) the accumulated gap is large: for the poorest fifth of children only 21 per 
cent gain five ‘good’ GCSEs (grade C or above)  compared with 75 per cent from 
the richest quintile. While much of this gap is attributable to early factors in 
children’s upbringing, differences in parental attitudes and children’s beliefs in 
their own academic ability also matter to children’s overall attainment. The 
conclusion that Goodman and Gregg reach is that policy can make a difference 
to reducing educational inequalities by improving the home learning environment, 
raising parents’ educational expectations and aspirations. Children’s own 
attitudes can also be influenced by addressing behavioural problems and 
encouraging children from poorer backgrounds to have greater belief in their own 
academic abilities. While the evidence provides strong support for early 
interventions to improve children’s outcomes, late interventions during teenage 
years may also have beneficial effects and prevent those from poor backgrounds 
from falling further behind. 
 
Thus, a large body of research explores how work, income and parental 
education influences children. Nearly all studies suggest that raising incomes for 
poorer families makes a difference to children’s educational attainment. Although 
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the studies vary in their findings on the size on these effects, they all suggest that 
the magnitude is too small to reasonably expect welfare benefits alone to close 
the educational gap between poor and rich children, but it does help. Work 
among lone mothers which does not boost income, however, does not benefit 
children; this suggests that worklessness isn’t the main issue in this domain. 
Education of parents is a major structural barrier to children’s development and 
reforms or programmes that raise parents’ education, particularly among those 
with low attainment, can make a large difference to children. 
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Addiction  
 
The Centre for Social Justice has highlighted alcohol and drug addiction as one 
of their five “pathways to poverty” (Centre for Social Justice, 2006). This analysis 
describes these behaviours both as causes and consequences of poverty, 
leading to a cumulative cycle of deepening poverty that needs to be broken. Yet, 
while poverty affects more than one in five of the population, serious problems of 
drug and alcohol addiction are of a different order of magnitude. Best estimates 
of the number of problematic drug users (‘PDUs’, defined as users of crack 
cocaine or opiates), for example, suggest that 0.89 per cent of the population is 
affected (Hay et al., 2011) while 3.8 per cent of the adult population (1.6 million 
people) is estimated to be dependent on alcohol (this group is identified using the 
Adult Use Disorders Identification Test, NICE, 2011). Overall, the total number of 
adults who are either dependent on alcohol or are PDUs is therefore estimated to 
be less than 4.7 per cent of the population (as there will be some overlap 
between PDUs and those with alcohol disorders). While there are no direct 
estimates of drug and alcohol misuse among people in poverty, of those that are 
in receipt of out-of-work benefits, Hay and Bauld (2008, 2010) estimate that just 
over ¼ million are problem drug users, and around 160,000 claimants are 
estimated to be dependent drinkers, equating to 7 per cent and 4 per cent of 
those claiming benefits respectively. 
 
These numbers show the problem of addiction, while severe for those affected, is 
not common among those that are in poverty – only a small fraction are affected. 
The scales of the problems of poverty and addiction among parents, for example, 
are of completely different orders of magnitude: one-in-four working age adults 
living in a couple with children are poor, but fewer than 3 percent are alcohol 
dependent and less than one percent drug dependent (HBAI, 2011 and Gould, 
2006).  Yet, in spite of this, the public perception appears to be that these 
problems are a common cause of poverty: recent data from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey (2011) found the factor most commonly cited as a reason for 
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child poverty was drug and alcohol addiction, 75 per cent thinking it was a reason 
for children living in poverty while drug and alcohol addiction has been cited as 
an argument against increasing the incomes of people in poverty (see, for 
example, Iain Duncan Smith’s speech to the London School of Economics, 1 
December 2011).  
 
What is the link between drug and alcohol misuse and poverty? The evidence on 
drug use and alcohol consumption suggests that both are widespread in society; 
for the most part, consumption bears little relationship to social class or income. 
Looking at alcohol consumption, the BMA (2008) reports that those in work drink 
more than those who are unemployed and that average consumption rises with 
income. Marmot (1997) presents similar evidence for ‘heavy’ drinking (those 
regularly drinking above the recommended daily allowance) which shows lower 
levels of heavy consumption among unemployed people than among those in 
work, with the greatest incidence among those in professional and managerial 
occupations. He concludes that survey evidence does not “lend support to the 
popular conception that it is the poor and unemployed who are disproportionately 
represented among heavy drinkers”. Similarly, data on drug use shows that, 
while experimentation with drugs is widespread among young people (one-half of 
all 16- to 24-year-olds report having used drugs at some time), there is little 
variation by socio-economic circumstances or correlation with poverty and social 
exclusion (British Crime Survey data, see The Poverty Site, 
http://www.poverty.org.uk/38/index.shtml). 
 
Overall therefore, general patterns of drug use and alcohol consumption exhibit 
little correlation with poverty or social class. But these average statistics do not 
deal with the extremes in the population: alcohol misuse and the incidence of 
PDUs are much higher among marginal groups such as the prison population, 
young offenders, and homeless people (see Shaw et al., 2007). These groups 
are often excluded from household survey data. These extreme cases, as 
Marmot (ibid.) describes them, “may well be unemployed and of lower socio-
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economic status, perhaps as a consequence of their drinking”. But “just as the 
issue of socio-economic influences on health is not confined to those at the 
bottom of the distribution, so is the problem of alcohol in society not confined to 
the relatively small proportion at the extreme of heavy intake. At less extreme 
levels of consumption, the data does not suggest that there are higher levels of 
consumption among those in less fortunate socio-economic circumstances.”  
 
For those at these “extremes”, however, alcohol and drug misuse is undoubtedly 
a serious problem, which has associations with unemployment and social 
exclusion. Good quality data on drug and alcohol misuse is sparse. The evidence 
that does exist, however, notes a relationship between addiction with poverty and 
social exclusion. Alcohol Focus Scotland, for example, notes the stark socio-
economic gradient in alcohol-related deaths and hospital admissions: “people 
from the most deprived areas in Scotland are six times more likely to be admitted 
to hospital with an alcohol-related diagnosis than people from the most affluent 
areas, while in 2005, 64 per cent of alcohol-related deaths were amongst the 
most deprived members of society”. They also report that the heaviest drinkers 
(those drinking more than 50 units per week) are concentrated in the lowest 
income quintile.  
 
Problematic drug use (PDU) is also correlated with poverty, as Shaw et al. (2007) 
report, with those at the “margins” of society most at risk, such as those in care, 
excluded from school and in contact with criminal justice or mental health 
services, and homeless people. Shaw et al. also report evidence which suggests 
that the poorest communities and those with high levels of unemployment are 
most affected by PDU. Causal effects include poor social capital within 
communities and weak family networks. Others link PDU to limited opportunities 
and structural disadvantages: Buchanan (2004, reported in Shaw et al., 2007) 
argues that PDU may be a “socially constructed phenomenon that has less to do 
with individual choice or physical dependence, and much more to do with the 
structural disadvantages, limited opportunities, alternatives and resources”. In 
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particular, he suggests that disadvantage and exclusion were major issues 
preceding a drugs habit for PDUs.  
 
Pudney (2003) reports similar findings, concluding that policies directed at 
reducing social deprivation may have the most success in reducing the 
prevalence of the most damaging drugs. Shaw et al. (ibid.) conclude in their 
review of poverty and drug use that: 
 
“a central message emerging from this literature review is that, although 
there appears to be no direct causal link between drug-related problems 
and poverty per se, the current evidence demonstrates strong 
associations. Despite these strong associations, over the last 10 years the 
UK ‘drug problem’ has been increasingly reframed as a ‘crime problem’ – 
part of a growing trend towards the ‘criminalization’ of a range of policy 
areas such as youth work and urban regeneration. By prioritizing these 
policy areas in relation to their crime control potential, a range of 
inequalities are being exacerbated.”   
 
The Coalition Government has advocated an approach to addressing addiction 
“rooted in the concept of recovery and reintegration; a process through which an 
individual is enabled to overcome the symptoms and causes of their dependency 
and reintegrate back into society” (Hay and Bauld, 2010). However, in the 
context on employment it has been argued that welfare-to-work programmes 
may be less suitable for these groups. Kemp and Neale (2005) find that drug 
users, for example, require other personal, health, lifestyle, and other problems 
to be addressed prior to participating in welfare-to-work programmes or taking up 
employment. Such findings are echoed by Bauld et al. (ibid); they recommend a 
stepwise approach to reintegrating those who misuse alcohol back into 
employment, with treatment and recovery from alcoholism being a first step. 
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Debt 
 
The final pathway to poverty that the Centre for Social Justice (2006) identifies is 
personal debt. While those with low incomes are at greatest risk of debt, 
research for JRF has shown that what sets apart borrowing by those on low 
incomes from the rest of the population is not the fact that they use credit 
(growing indebtedness over the last decade was widespread as a ‘culture’ of 
borrowing grew) but rather that their indebtedness often arose because their 
income levels made borrowing a necessity in order to meet basic day-to-day 
needs (Dearden et al., 2010). Six in every ten adults living in the poorest income 
quintile turn to borrowing over a 12-month period (Collard and Kempson, 2005). 
For many, serious debt problems result from an accumulation of debt over time 
as a result of persistently low levels of income. Work on Minimum Income 
Standards (MIS) shows that, for those on benefits or with relatively low earnings, 
incomes are likely to be insufficient to meet the current standard: in 2011, MIS 
equated to £15,000 gross earnings for a single adult, £18,243 for a lone parent 
with one child, and £36,800 for a couple with two children, both working full-time. 
(Note: MIS is calculated on the basis of what members of the public think people 
need to achieve a minimum socially acceptable standard of living.) In terms of 
the resulting net incomes, for those on benefits, payments fell short of meeting 
these standards by 60 per cent, 36 per cent and 38 per cent respectively (Hirsch, 
2011). For those in full-time work the average wage would need to be 
substantially greater than the current minimum wage in order to bring in the 
minimum income. As a result, those whose incomes are persistently low – 
whether in or out of work – are likely to fall further into debt in order to meet day-
to-day expenses. This, in turn, reduces their ability to meet existing debt 
payments and leads to an increasing reliance on credit and further indebtedness.  
Other research supports the link between low income and borrowing for 
essentials; for example, Dearden et al. (2010) find that over-indebtedness is 
typically a result of inadequate income rather than profligate consumption.  
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While these structural features – in particular insecure and low-paid jobs 
alongside low benefit levels – are important factors leading to indebtedness 
among those with low incomes, there are also other important ‘triggers’ which 
lead to over-indebtedness. Dearden et al. (ibid.) point to: high levels of consumer 
temptation leading to credit card expenditure among the young, with this debt 
then carried over into adult life; important life shocks such as having children or 
relationship breakdown; the onset of disability or ill health; or large unexpected 
expenditure shocks.  
 
For those on low incomes the cost of being indebted is often much higher than it 
is to those on higher incomes and with more serious consequences:  
 
“The poor pay more for many things – but, arguably, it is the extent to 
which they pay more for credit that puts the greatest strain on their 
budgets. In fact, levels of credit use vary little with household income. But, 
in contrast to people who are better off, people on low incomes borrow 
more often for necessities and use sources of credit that have higher 
charges.”  
(Collard and Kempson, 2005: p. 1) 
 
In spite of credit being more easily available in 2005 than a decade earlier, even 
in these times of high borrowing availability of “high-street” credit was still 
severely constrained for people on low and insecure incomes. Six in ten of those 
in the lowest income quintile felt that borrowing from mainstream lenders was not 
an option (Collard and Kempson, ibid.). Instead many turned to the sub-prime 
credit market, with annual percentage rates (APRs) typically between 100 and 
400 per cent (see Collard and Kempson, ibid., and references therein). Those 
living in deprived areas, in particular, suffered “a double disadvantage, especially 
if they live in a high-rise block of flats or an area of high crime” with licensed 
lenders unwilling to do business in these areas. This lack of mainstream credit, 
alongside inadequate incomes, has meant that many are vulnerable to being 
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targeted by lenders offering loans with high rates of interest, and with default 
often incurring high charges. Among the poorest fifth of the adult population, 
Collard and Kempson estimate that of the 6.7 million adults aged 18–64 in these 
households, 1.8 million had borrowed money over the previous year: of these, 
1.1 million had borrowed from a high-cost lender, with 0.5 million using 
catalogues and 0.5 million borrowing from moneylenders (also known as home 
credit services). For many who borrowed default was common, and around one 
in four of those on low income had an adverse credit record. Since the ‘credit 
crunch’ further increased conditions on lending – and as incomes have continued 
to be squeezed, particularly for low-income households (see Hirsch, 2011) – 
reliance on these types of loans may have grown. Dearden (ibid.) notes that 
“given that many households have no choice but to borrow on an ongoing basis, 
it would seem likely that their borrowing will shift to less formal and less regulated 
providers”.  
 
The policy response has called for the greater regulation of lenders and better 
financial education. But raising incomes among those in poverty and helping to 
smooth income flows, particularly around transition periods such as divorce or 
separation, are also important for reducing the current problems of severe 
personal debt. There is a widespread consensus that regulation is needed to 
ensure people in poverty have access to affordable credit, but implementing this 
remains problematic. The previous government expressed an interest in 
exploring mechanisms that would allow profitable loans to be made through the 
voluntary and private sector to those on a low income at lower rates of interest 
(Collard and Kempson, ibid.). However, a study examining the feasibility of a not-
for-profit home credit service found that implementing such a service would be 
difficult (Kempson et al., 2009). While demand for such a service is high among 
those with low incomes, high rates of default and the potential for ‘adverse 
selection’, with those with the worst payment problems most likely to take up the 
scheme, present particular challenges to implementation. The authors calculate 
that – even on a not-for-profit basis and with substantial subsidies – the cost of 
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provision would still remain high if the service was to be financially sustainable. 
For example, with an £18 million subsidy to the provider, the APR that would 
need to be charged on an average 56-week £288 loan would be 123 per cent 
(compared with 183 per cent commercially), saving customers £50. Partly as a 
result of these high interest rates, but also because of high rates of default 
among high-risk borrowers and the threat this would place on providers’ financial 
sustainability, the authors found that existing third-sector lenders “had limited 
appetite for delivering the service”. 
 
Hirsch (2011) reports that the “squeeze in living standards is hitting those on low 
incomes particularly hard, in part because of relatively high inflation rates but 
also because of policy decisions that have restricted their net incomes”. This 
continued squeeze on those who are least able to bear the cost means that 
indebtedness is likely to become an increasing problem in the next few years. As 
credit continues to be constrained, particularly for those on low incomes, it seems 
likely that many will be forced to borrow from high-cost providers, deepening the 
debt cycle. Finally, at present many of those on low incomes are repaying loans 
from the Social Fund. The Social Fund is a cash-limited fund available to those 
on qualifying benefits, with loans being provided interest-free in order to pay for 
essential items such as furniture, beds and bedding, and white goods. The 
Welfare Reform Bill 2011 has proposed that the Social Fund be replaced with 
local provision; this may lead to reduced provision and increase further the 
burden of indebtedness among those on low incomes. 
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Conclusion 
 
This review has highlighted the role of structures, individual agency and ‘cultures 
of poverty’ in influencing overall poverty rates, and the ways in which they 
interact.  
 
The evidence reviewed here on the structural causes of poverty suggests an 
important role for policy. The provision of family-related benefits, the incentives 
provided for work (through, for example, tax credits but also through the provision 
of measures to support parents at work, such as childcare), and the availability of 
jobs all play a very important role in influencing poverty. The availability of jobs, 
in particular, matters not just for individual poverty but also to communities, with 
the geographical concentration of worklessness and unemployment among the 
young posing particular problems of ‘scarring’. A lack of economic opportunities 
for men has also been shown to influence family forms, reducing the value of 
marriage for women to marry and increasing the likelihood of becoming a lone 
parent (see Lundberg and Pollak, 2007; Rowthorn and Webster, 2008).  
 
Benefits too can make a difference to poverty; the rise in market-income poverty, 
which has been happening across countries since the mid-1980s, has to some 
extent been offset by government redistribution (OECD, 2011a). However, a 
specific charge against the provision of welfare benefits is that they have led to a 
growing dependency culture. The interaction of agency and structure, in this 
context, is argued to have led to a breakdown in personal responsibility, a rise in 
family breakdown and lone parenthood, and the growth of a culture of 
dependency and intergenerational worklessness (Centre for Social Justice, 
2006). The evidence for this is much less clear. Welfare dependency as an 
explanation for the growth in family breakdown does not fit well with the facts; 
Lundberg and Pollak (2007) conclude that “the potential effectiveness of policies 
to promote marriage is [...] questionable. In the United States, state and federal 
welfare reforms that imposed time limits and work requirements dramatically 
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reduced welfare rolls and promoted employment among low-income women. 
These policies, however, do not appear to have had significant effects on 
marriage or the living arrangements of children” (p. 23). Similarly, the evidence 
on intergenerational worklessness does not provide support for the idea that 
there are a large number of families never working across generations: even 
among a single generation virtually no one has no experience of doing paid work 
by middle age. 
 
Policy may also be able to intervene to influence behaviour and, over the longer 
term, attitudes towards work. For example, the increased ‘activation’ of groups of 
workers who previously had few expectations of work placed on them may both 
raise current employment levels but may also change attitudes towards work 
over the longer term. The introduction of increased conditionality on the receipt of 
benefits for groups, such as lone parents, will also alter their job search 
behaviour and their chance of moving into work. Reforms to the benefit system 
have placed greater conditionality on both lone parents and other groups 
including those previously claiming Incapacity Benefit and can be expected to 
raise employment and contribute towards reducing poverty. Set against this, 
however, is the currently weak economic picture where unemployment has been 
rising. The rise in unemployment is likely to be the greatest barrier to poverty 
reduction in coming years. This structural challenge to poverty is not being 
addressed under current policy reforms, which emphasise supply-side changes 
and the role of agency in determining overall poverty rates. 
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